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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
imate cause all too current in decisions of that period. He fore-
saw that legal duty was a necessary antecedent to liability for
negligence. The more searching analysis of the last forty years
into this branch of "Everyman's Law" however, if this study
is correct, indicates that such a case should be squarely decided
upon the question of legal duty alone. It is hoped that the Mon-
tana Court will have opportunity to re-examine the question
when the facts warrant in the light of a general recent tendency
to consider many cases formerly decided in the law of proximate
cause as presenting more properly an inquiry into the subject
of legal duty.
-John D. McKinnon.
RECOVERY FOR NERVOUS INJURY CAUSED BY
NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT IMPACT
On three occasions the attention of the Montana Supreme
Court has been directed to the question of tort liability for
mental or nervous injury caused by negligence where there
has been no contemporaneous physical impact upon the person
of the plaintiff. In 1909, the court, in sustaining a special de-
murrer for uncertainty to a complaint, indicated that "The
right was with the defendants of having the plaintiff allege
specifically whether she claimed damages as the result of phy-
sical injuries and mental disturbance, or the latter alone, so
that they might prepare for trial."1 Again in 1934 in Cashin v.
Northern Pacific Ry Co! the question was before the court; the
court held that plaintiff may recover for physical injury caused
by the defendant's negligent conduct even though there was no
contemporaneous physical contact. The latest Montana pro-
'Hosty v. Moulton Water Co. 39 Mont. 310, 102 P. 568.
296 Mont. 92, 28 P. (2d) 862. Plaintiff lived near the railroad tracks
of defendant in a mountainous area where rocks threatening the safe-
ty of the railroad grade were from time to time removed by blasting.
Without notice to the plaintiff, whom defendant knew to be a woman
of nervous temperament, defendant set off a charge of dynamite shat-
tering glass in the Cashin home and prostrating the plaintiff, causing
physical injury induced by the shock. In giving judgment for the
plaintiff, the Court said, "Often the physical injury caused by the
wrecking of the nervous system is more serious and lasting than the
breaking of bones or the tearing of flesh, and, where it is clearly
shown that such injury was suffered and was proximately caused by
the negligent act of the defendant, a cause of action exists for dam-
ages for the resulting injury, and stands on a more firm foundation
of reason than does that class of cases wherein it is held that the
plaintiff must have been physically battered, 'although slightly', in or-
der to recover for fright or mental distress."
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nouncement came in the case of Kelly v. Lowney & Williams,'
affirming the position taken in the Cashin case.
In the latter case, auto salesman Lowney, an officer of
the firm of Lowney & Williams, defendants, called upon Jen-
sen with whom he was about to close a sale for an auto. Jen-
sen accompanied Lowney to the car, and got into the driver's
seat "to see what it feels like." Lowney knew Jensen could
not operate an automobile and that the vehicle was being pur-
chased for Jensen's daughter to drive. The motor was started
under Lowney's direction and allowed to run several seconds,
when suddenly the car shot forward. It pursued a devious
path for a few blocks guided by the inexpert handling of Jen-
sen and finally crashed into the house occupied by Nellie Kel-
ly. Mrs. Kelly's daughter cried out that it must be an earth-
quake and Mrs. Kelly thought it was an explosion. There was
no contemporaneous physical contact between the machine and
Mrs. Kelly. Six months later she was dead, the doctor said
from complications arising out of a cold. The children testi-
fied that after the accident their mother could not sleep, was
nervous, and worried about who was to pay for the damage
to the house. The husband, as administrator, sued for injur-
ies to Mrs. Kelly and to the house. He recovered a judgment
for $3500, $1000 of which covered the damage to the dwelling.
On appeal, the Court affirmed the judgment as to the cause of
action involving property damage, but reversed and remanded
the cause dealing with the personal injuries to Mrs. Kelly on
the basis of an erroneous instruction which assumed as a mat-
ter of law that the crash was the proximate cause of the death.
The Court remarked in the portion of the opinion with which
this comment deals, "At the outset it is well to point out that
in this state there may be recovery for damages for personal
injuries occasioned by fright or mental shock though there be
no physical contact.""
There has been a sharp split among the authorities as to
whether the defendant must respond in damages for physical
injuries as a consequence of fright induced by defendant's
conduct where there is no contemporaneous physical injury.
It seems that no recovery is permitted in the federal courts, in
Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Pennsyl-
'(1942) ..... Mont ....... 126 P. (2d) 486.
'(1942) ...... Mont ....... , 126 P. (2d) 486, 487.
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vania.' Canada likewise denies recovery.! The reasons ad-
vanced for denying recovery in this class of cases are first,
since fright itself is not a cause of action, its consequences
are not compensable; second, the damages resulting from the
fright are too remote; and third, that it is contrary to public
policy to allow recovery for personal injuries resulting from
fright.'
Professor Bohlen' answers in this manner the argument
that the consequences of fright warrant no recovery since
fright itself is not a cause of action: "The fright is not the
ground of the action-the physical injury is the damage al-
leged; the fright is but stated as indicating the causal connec-
tion between the wrong and the injury .... " The difference
is succinctly stated in 25 C. J. S. 552 as follows: "Mental
pain and suffering as such must be distinguished from pain
and suffering ensuing from an injury to the nervous system,
which is to be regarded as a physical injury, and as such suf-
ficient in itself to support a recovery of damages." When it
is perceived that the action is prosecuted for the physical re-
sults of the fright, and not for any fleeting and immeasurable
inequilibrium in the mind alone, there is less objection to per-
mitting recovery.
Text authority' on the proximate cause aspect of the ques-
tion denominates the fright of the plaintiff occasioned by de-
fendant's wrongful conduct as an intervening but not supersed-
'Haile v. Texas & P. R. Co. (1894) 60 F. 557, 23 U. S. App. 80, 9 C. C.
A. 134, 23 L. R. A. 774; St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Bragg (1901)
69 Ark. 402, 64 S. W. 226, 86 Am. St. Rep. 206; Allen v. Harris & Sat-
terfield (1916) 146 Ga. 232, 91 S. E. 28; Braun v. Craven (1898) 175
Ill. 401, 51 N. E. 657, 42 L. R. A. 199, 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 15; Louisville
& N. R. Co. v. Roberts (1925) 207 Ky. 310, 269 S. W. 333; Spade v.
Lynn & B. R. Co. (1897) 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88, 38 L. R. A. 512,
60 Am. St. Rep. 393; Nelson v. Crawford (1899) 122 Mich. 466, 81 N.
W. 335, 80 Am. St. Rep. 577; Weissman v. Wells (1924) 306 Mo. 82,
267 S. W. 400; Ward v. West Jersey & S. R. Co. (1900) 65 N. J. L.
383, 47 A. 561; Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co. (1896) 151 N. Y. 107,
45 N. E. 354, 34 L. R. A. 781, 56 Am. St. Rep. 604; Miller v. Baltimore
& 0. S. W. R. Co. (1908) 79 Ohio St. 309, 85 N. E. 499, 18 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 949, 125 Am. St. Rep. 699; Ewing v. Pittsburg C. C. & St. L.
R. Co. (1892) 147 Pa. 140, 23 A. 340, 14 L. R. A. 666, 30 Am. St. Rep.
709.
'Henderson v. Canada Atlantic R. Co. (1898) 25 Ont. App. Rep. 437.
'Throckmorton, Damage8 for Fright, 34 HARv. L. REV. 260, 265 (1921).
"Right to Reicover for Injury Resulting from Negligence Without Im-
pact, 50 AM. L. REG. 141, 173 (1902).
'25 C. J. S. 557. "A more logical view is that, in the case of physical
consequences of fright, the fright occasioned by defendant's wrongful
act is an intervening but not a controlling cause, and that a recovery
may be had for the physical consequences as the natural and proxi-
mate consequences of the original wrongful act."
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ing cause. In Purcell v. St. Paul City By. Co.," a woman suf-
fered fright and ultimate miscarriage as a result of confusion
and alarm attending a near collision between another car and
the car of defendant on which the plaintiff was a passenger;
the court treated proximate cause in this fashion: "Now, if the
fright was the natural consequence of-was brought about,
caused by-the circumstances of peril and alarm in which de-
fendant's negligence placed plaintiff, and the fright caused the
nervous shock and convulsions and consequent illness, the neg-
ligence was the proximate cause of those injuries." Writers 1
regard the fright simply as a link in the chain of causation,
much as the impact is considered a link. The trend of modern
decisions would seem to indicate that if plaintiff is to be denied
recovery for nervous injury it must be on grounds other than as
a study in the law of proximate cause.
The third reason advanced for denying recovery in this
class of cases is the most substantial. The Mitchell case' and
the Spade case," both early decisions, emphasize the practical
hazards of enforcing a rule of recovery where the claims can be
easily feigned and are supported by the partisan testimony of
the plaintiff and medical experts. The New York court thus
registered its objection in the Mitchell case:
"If the right of recovery in this class of cases should be
once established, it would naturally result in a flood of liti-
gation in cases where the injury complained of may be easily
feigned without detection, and where the damages must rest
on mere conjecture or speculation."
T~he reasoning of the courts has been that since no practical rule
can be administered in the absence of impact, no recovery at
all should be permitted. And the requirement of impact in most
industrial states must still be met today in mental disturbance
cases." Guaranty of the genuineness of the injury" is found in
" (1892) 48 Minn. 134, 50 N. W. 1034, 16 L. R. A. 203.
"Throckmorton, 34 HARV. L. REv. 260, 268 (1921) ; Bohlen, 50 AM. L.
Rm. 141, 173 (1902).
"Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co. (1896) 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354, 34
L. R. A. 781, 56 Am. St. Rep. 604. Comstock v. Wilson (1931) 257 N. Y.
231, 177 N. E. 431, 76 A. L. R. 676, seems to limit the Mitchell case.
"Spade v. Lynn & B. R. Co. (1897) 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88, 38 L. R.
A. 512, 60 Am. St. Rep. 393. A later Massachusetts case, Freedman v.
Eastern Mass. St. Ry. Co. (1938) 299 Mass. 246, 12 N. E. (2d) 739 in-
trudes on the doctrine of the Spade case.
"PROSSF ON ToRTS, p. 214.
'Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co. (1902) 180 Mass. 456, 62 N. E. 737,
57 L. R. A. 291, 91 Am. St. Rep. 324. Per Holmes, C. J. "Even were
it otherwise, recognizing as we must the logic in favor of the plaintiff
when a remedy is denied because the only immediate wrong was a
shock to the nerves, we think that when the reality of the cause is
4
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the impact, according to this view, but any contact, dust in the
eyes,' or a rough seating on the floor," is sufficient for the pur-
poses of the doctrine. Professor Goodrich" states that thus the
magic formula, impact, is pronounced and the door opens to the
joy of a complete recovery, although it is frankly admitted that
damages are not limited to the hurt caused by the impact alone.
Thus is seen the anomaly of the recognition of a cause of action,
whereas relief is denied because of public policy, absent the
magic formula.
Courts of other jurisdictions are aware of the principal ob-
jection to the doctrine, namely, the administrative difficulty,
but recognize that it is the policy of the law to permit just liti-
gation. Hence, recovery is allowed in fright cases even though
there is no impact in the states of Alabama, California, Louisi-
ana, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wis-
consin." England, Ireland and Scotland also permit recovery."
Bohlen urges that the physical injury caused by the fright
through the internal operation of the mind and nervous system
may be proved like any other injury quite as accurately as many
of the intricate consequences of a physical impact.' In the words
guaranteed by proof of a substantial battery of the person, there is no
occasion to press further the exception to general rules."
"Porter v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co. (1906) 73 N. J. L. 405, 63 A. 860.
"Driscoll v. Gaffey (1910) 207 Mass. 102, 92 N. E. 1010.
'Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MIcH. L. REv. 497, 504
(1922).
"Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Kimber (1924) 212 Ala. 102, 101 So. 827;
Lindley v. Knowlton (1918) 179 Cal. 298, 176 P. 440; Stewart v. Ark.
So. Ry. Co. (1904) 112 La. 764, 36 So. 676; Green v. Shoemaker & Co.
(1909) 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 667; Purcell v. St.
Paul City Ry. Co. (1892) 48 Minn. 134, 50 N. W. 1034, 16 L. R. A.
203; Cashin v. Nor. Pac. Ry. Co. (1934) 96 Mont. 92, 28 P. (2d) 862;
Hanford v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co. (1925) 113 Neb. 423, 203 N. W.
643, 40 A. L. R. 970; Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors
(1930) 84 N. H. 329, 150 A. 540; Watkins v. Kaolin Mfg. Co. (1902)
131 N. C. 536, 42 S. E. 983, 60 L. R. A. 617, 13 Am. Neg. Rep. 197;
Salmi v. Columbia Ry. Co. (1915) 75 Or. 200, 146 P. 819, L. R. A.
1915D 834; Simone v. Rhode Island Co. (1907) 28 R. I. 186, 66 A. 202,
9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 740; Mack v. South Bound R. Co. (1898) 52 S. C.
323, 29 S. E. 905, 40 L. R. A. 679, 68 Am. St. Rep. 913; Sternhagen v.
Kozel (1918) 40 S. D. 396, 167 N. W. 398; Memphis St. R. Co. v. Bern-
stein (1917) 137 Tenn. 637, 194 S. W. 902; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v.
Hayter (1900) 93 Tex. 239, 54 S. W. 944, 47 L. R. A. 325, 77 Am. St.
Rep. 856; O'Meara v. Russell (1916) 90 Wash. 557, 156 P. 550, L. R. A.
1916E 743; Lambert v. Brewster (1925) 97 W. Va. 124, 125 S. E. 244;
Pankopf v. Hinkley (1909) 141 Wis. 146, 123 N. W. 625, 24 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1159.
"Annotation, 11 A. L. R. 1134.
"50 AM. L. Rw. 141, 172.
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of Bowman v. Williams," "These considerations (effect of fright
being subjective, imaginative, conjectural and speculative) un-
deniably tend to multiply fictitious or speculative claims, and to
open to unscrupulous litigants a wide field for exploitation, but
these difficulties are common, are surmountable, and so should
not prevent the operation of the general and fundamental theory
of the common law that there is a remedy for every substantial
wrong." It is submitted that a better view is to recognize the
physical injury caused by nervous disturbance as a cause of ac-
tion in the substantive law of torts and leave the solution of the
question of the feigned claims to be dealt with according to the
law of evidence.
The Torts Restatement, section 436, ' is in point. With
Subsection (1) we are not here concerned since that states the
rule of liability for negligent conduct which is obviously likely
to cause the fright but not the bodily harm which did in fact oc-
cur. Under Subsection (2) the actor is not protected from lia-
bility when his conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable
risk of bodily harm by means of, for example, impact, where the
victim manages to escape the peril but suffers physical illness or
injury as a result of the fright. The Restatement concurs with
the majority of courts in recognizing a legitimate cause of ac-
tion, but appends a specific caveat expressing no opinion as to
whether the unreliability of the testimony necessary to establish
the causal connection between the negligence and the illness or
injury may make it proper for the court of a particular juris-
diction to refuse to place liability on the defendant as a matter
of administrative policy.
-(1933) 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182.
'§436 Physical Harm Resulting from Emotional Disturbance.
"(1) If the actor's conduct is negligent as violating a duty of care de-
signed to protect another from a fright or other emotional disturbance
which the actor should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of
bodily harm, the fact that the harm results solely through the internal
operation of the fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect
the actor from liability.
(2) If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable
risk of causing bodily harm to another otherwise than by subjecting
him to fright, shock or other similar and immediate emotional disturb-
ance, the fact that such harm results solely from the internal opera-
tion of fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the actor
from liability."
Caveat to Subsection (2) : The Institute expresses no opinion that
the unreliability of the testimony necessary to establish the causal
relation between the actor's negligence and the other's illness or
bodily harm may not make It proper for the court of a particularjurisdiction to refuse, as a matter of administrative policy, to hold
the actor liable for harm to another which was brought about in
the manner stated in this Subsection.
6
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In the jurisdictions permitting recovery for negligent inva-
sion of plaintiff's right to be free from physical injury without
impact, it is generally recognized that plaintiff's case will be
stronger when he has been put in peril of imminent bodily harm.
Recovery has also been allowed in cases of peril to a third per-
son witnessed by plaintiff when plaintiff has some close family
relationship, " of wilful or wanton wrong,' and of invasion of
the right of privacy." A minority of the courts permit recovery
against a telegraph company for negligent transmission of mes-
sages which indicate on their face that damage may result ;' but
a majority of the states and the federal courts' are opposed. In
food contamination cases, recovery is often allowed; the nausea
is taken by some courts to be the impact.' Actions for recovery
"Lindley v. Knowlton (1918) 179 Cal. 298, 176 P. 440; Frazee v. West-
ern Dairy Products Co. (1935) 182 Wash. 578, 47 P. (2d) 1037; Ham-
brook v. Stokes [1925] 1 K. B. 141, 94 L. J. K. B. 435; Lambert v.
Brewster (1925) 97 W. Va. 124, 125 S. E. 244. 11 A. L. R. 1143 states
the general rule thus: "Recovery for the physical consequences of
fright at another's peril has generally been denied." See Prosser at p.
218.
ELesch v. Gt. Northern Ry. Co. (1906) 97 Minn. 503, 106 N. W. 956;
Rogers v. Willard (1920) 144 Ark. 587, 223 S. W. 15, 11 A. L. R. 1115;
Gadbury v. Bleitz (1925) 133 Wash. 134, 233 P. 299, 44 A. L. R. 425.
In the Rogers case said the court: ....... while it is held that there
can be no recovery for bodily pain resulting from fright caused by an
unintentional negligent act where the fright is not accompanied by
bodily injury, still it is inferable from that case (St. L., I. M. & S. I.
Co. v. Bragg (1901) 69 Ark. 402, 64 S. W. 226, 86 Am. St. Rep. 206)
and the cases cited in the decision that the right to recover for bodily
pain and suffering resulting from fright which is caused by a willful
wrong may be regarded as established in this state."
"Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co. (1941) 166 Or. 482, 113 P. (2d) 438.
Plaintiff sued defendant which had caused a telegram falsely using
plaintiff's name as a signature to be sent to the governor of Oregon
urging him to veto a bill which would have prevented defendant from
engaging in the optical fitters' business. Plaintiff alleged he was a
civil service employee and by law prohibited from engaging in polit-
ical activities and that the telegram jeopardized his rights. The court
in overruling a demurrer to the complaint said, "But it is well settled
that where the wrongful act constitutes an infringement of a legal
right, mental suffering may be recovered for, if it Is the direct, proxi-
mate and natural result of the wrongful act .... Violation of the right
of privacy is a wrong of that character."
'nPossER oN TORTS, p. 216.
gMees v. Western Union Tel. Co. (1932) 55 F. (2d) 691 on the author-
ity of Jones v. Western Union Tel. Co. (1916) 233 F. 301 and Ey v.
Western Union Tel. & Cable Co. (1924) 298 F. 357, which were based
on Southern Express Co. v. Byers (1915) 240 U. S. 612, 60 L. Ed. 825,
36 S. Ct. 410. The Byers case was one for mental damages for negli-
gent transfer of the body of plaintiff's wife. ". ..... the decisions to
this effect (denying recovery) rest upon the elementary principle that
mere mental pain and anxiety are too vague for legal redress where
no injury is done to person, property, health, or reputation."
"Kenny v. Wong Len (1925) 81 N. H. 427, 128 A. 343. "To discrimi-
nate between this (finding a mouse in plaintiff's mouth making her sick
7
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in this type of case are sometimes prosecuted on the theory of
implied warranty." - In some cases, courts have permitted re-
covery where defendant's practical joke has resulted in harm to
the plaintiff ;" whether this is based on negligence or wilful tort
is not too clear.
The Montana Court has adopted the forward view on the
question of liability of a negligent defendant for physical injur-
ies to a plaintiff caused through the medium of emotional dis-
turbance. The impact doctrine is receiving less favorable treat-
ment in the courts even in those states where impact is essential
to make the cause of action complete. In such states, damages
are not limited to the mere physical injury caused at the place
of contact, but include in the recovery any mental or nervous in-
jury brought about by the fright as well, thus revealing only a
tenuous basis for differentiating the cases of impact on the per-
son from those in which no impact was present. The nervous
system is a part of the body and is susceptible of lesion from
causes primarily acting on the mind.' It is admitted that there
is danger in the possibility of fabricated claims being put forth
by unscrupulous litigants. Let the court dispose of this objec-
tion in the particular case as a question of the law of evidence,
thus permitting recovery in some cases while denying it in oth-
ers. The common law has a rich tradition of providing a rem-
edy for every substantial wrong, and there is presented in this
line of cases an opportune occasion for application of this com-
mon law principle. -- James A. Nelson.
and requiring medical attention) and an external force such as a
blow, cut, break or wrench would be a legal refinement, wholly arbi-
trary and unjust." The New Hampshire court broadens the definition
of fright in this case also. "Immediate physical injury as the result
of negligence being shown, whether or not induced by some sort of
fright, there may be recovery for subsequent mental or nervous trouble
with its attendant bodily effects, whether or not produced by fright
in a narrow sense or in a broad one to include emotions of disgust and
shame, if negligence is proved as its cause."
**Wheeler v. Balestri (1939) 304 Mass. 257, 23 N. E. (2d) 132. Nom-
inal damages only were awarded and these on the basis of implied
warranty statutes since the Massachusetts rule forbids recovery where
there is no physical injury as a result of Impact or eating of the food.
"Wilkinson v. Downton (1897) 2 Q. B. D. 57; Great A & P Co. v. Roch(1930) 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22. Contra, Nelson v. Crawford (1899)
122 Mich. 466, 81 N. W. 335, 80 Am. St. Rep. 577. Green, Fright Cases,
27 ILL. L. REv. 873, 882 (1933), favors placing liability on the practicaljoker. "What consequences should attach to the acts of a practicaljoker? It is his fun; it has no economic value; there are no conflict-
ing interests as there are in the other cases. Why should not the
practical joker bear the risks of injury which may result from hisjoke?"
=Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co. (1896) 111 Cal. 668, 44 P. 320. 32 L.
R. A. 193.
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